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Abstract: We introduce a model of super-exponential financial bubbles with
two assets (risky and risk-free), in which rational investors and noise traders
co-exist. Rational investors form expectations on the return and risk of
a risky asset and maximize their constant relative risk aversion expected
utility with respect to their allocation on the risky asset versus the risk-free
asset. Noise traders are subjected to social imitation and follow momentum
trading. Allowing for random time-varying herding propensity, we are able
to reproduce several well-known stylized facts of financial markets such as
a fat-tail distribution of returns and volatility clustering. In particular, we
observe transient faster-than-exponential bubble growth with approximate
log-periodic behavior and give analytical arguments why this follows from
our framework. The model accounts well for the behavior of traders and for
the price dynamics that developed during the dotcom bubble in 1995-2000.
Momentum strategies are shown to be transiently profitable, supporting these
strategies as enhancing herding behavior.
keywords: noise traders, financial bubbles, faster-than-exponential growth,
social imitation, momentum trading, dotcom bubble
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1 Introduction
The very existence of financial bubbles has been a controversial and elu-
sive subject. Some have argued that financial bubbles play a huge role in
the global economy, affecting hundreds of millions of people (Kindleberger,
1978; Shiller, 2000; Sornette , 2003). Others have basically ignored or re-
futed their possibility (Fama, 1998). Moreover, until recently, the existence
of such bubbles, much less their effects, have been ignored at the policy level.
Finally, only after the most recent historical global financial crisis, officials
at the highest level of government and academic finance have acknowledged
the existence and importance of identifying and understanding bubbles. the
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, William C. Dudley,
stated in April 2010 “what I am proposing is that we try—try to identify
bubbles in real time, try to develop tools to address those bubbles, try to use
those tools when appropriate to limit the size of those bubbles and, there-
fore, try to limit the damage when those bubbles burst.” Such a statement
from the New York Fed representing, essentially, the monetary policy of the
United States governmental banking system would have been, and, in some
circles, still is, unheard of. This, in short, is a bombshell and a wake-up call
to academics and practitioners. Dudley exhorts to try to develop tools to
address bubbles.
But before acting against bubbles, before even making progress in ex-ante
diagnosing bubbles, one needs to define what is a bubble. The problem is
that the “econometric detection of asset price bubbles cannot be achieved
with a satisfactory degree of certainty. For each paper that finds evidence of
bubbles, there is another one that fits the data equally well without allowing
for a bubble. We are still unable to distinguish bubbles from time-varying
or regime-switching fundamentals, while many small sample econometrics
problems of bubble tests remain unresolved.” summarizes Gurkaynak (2008)
in his review paper.
Let us start with the rather generally accepted stylized fact that, in a
period where a bubble is present, the stock return exhibits transient excess
return above the long-term historical average, giving rise to what could be
termed a “bubble risk premium puzzle”. For instance, as we report in the em-
pirical section, the valuation of the Internet stock index went from a reference
value 100 in January 1998 to a peak of 1400.06 in March 9, 2000, correspond-
ing to an annualized return of more than 350% ! A year and a half later,
the Internet stock valuation was back at its pre-1998 level. Another stylized
fact well represented during the dotcom bubble is the highly intermittent or
punctuated growth of the stock prices, with super-exponential accelerations
followed by transient corrections, themselves followed by further vigorous re-
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bounds (Johansen and Sornette, 2010; Sornette and Woodard, 2010). Bub-
bles are usually followed by crashes, in an often tautological logic resulting
from the fact that the existence of a crash is usually taken as the ex-post
signature of the bubble, as summarized by A. Greenspan (2002): “We, at
the Federal Reserve... recognized that, despite our suspicions, it was very
difficult to definitively identify a bubble until after the fact, that is, when its
bursting confirmed its existence...” More optimistically but still controver-
sial, recent systematic econometric studies have shown that it is possible to
relate objectively an anomalous transient excess return and the subsequent
crash (Sornette, 2003; Johansen and Sornette, 2010; Sornette et al., 2011).
The recent finance literature has evolved to increasingly recognize the
evidence of bubbles which is defined as deviations from fundamental value.
One important class of theories is related to noise traders (also referred to
as positive-feedback investors). The term “noise traders” was introduced
first by Kyle (1985) and Black (1986) to describe irrational investors. There-
after, many scholars exploited this concept to extend the standard mod-
els by introducing the simplest possible heterogeneity in terms of two in-
teracting populations of rational and irrational agents. One can say that
the one-representative-agent theory is being progressively replaced by a two-
representative-agents theory, analogously to the progress from the one-body
to the two-body problems in physics. It has been often explained that mar-
kets bubble and crash in the absence of significant shifts in economic fun-
damentals is often explained to occur when herders such as noise traders
deliberately act against their private information and follow the crowd.
De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990a, 1990b) proposed the
first model of market bubbles and crashes which exploits this idea of the pos-
sible role of noise traders following positive feedback strategies or momentum
investment strategies in the development of bubbles. They showed a possible
mechanism for why asset prices may deviate from the fundamentals over long
time periods. The key point is that trading between rational arbitrageurs and
noise traders gives rise to bubble-like price patterns. In their model, rational
speculators destabilize prices because their trading triggers positive feedback
trading by noise traders. Positive feedback trading by noise traders leads to
a positive auto-correlation of returns at short horizons. Eventually, arbitrage
by rational speculators will pull the prices back to fundamentals. Their arbi-
trage trading leads to a negative autocorrelation of returns at longer horizons.
Their work was followed by a number of empirical studies on positive
feedback tradings. The influential empirical evidence on positive feedback
trading came from the works of De Bondt and Thaler (1985), and Jegadeesh
and Titman (1993, 2001), which established that stock returns exhibit mo-
mentum behavior at intermediate horizons, and reversals at long horizons.
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That is, strategies which buy stocks that have performed well in the past
and sell stocks that have performed poorly in the past generate significant
positive returns over 3- to 12- month holding periods. However, stocks that
perform poorly in the past perform better over the next 3 to 5 years than
stocks that perform well in the past. Behavioral models that explain the
coexistence of intermediate horizon momentum and long horizon reversals in
stock returns are proposed by Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), Daniel,
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), and Hong and Stein (1999).
The behavior of investors who are driven by group psychology, so-called
interacting agents, and the aggregate behavioral outcomes, have also been
studied using frameworks suggested by Weidlich and Haag (1983), Blume
(1993; 1995), Brock (1993), Durlauf (1997; 1999), Kirman (1993), Brock and
Durlauf (2000), Aoki and Yoshikawa (2007), Chiarella, Dieci and He (2009)
and Hommes and Wagener (2009). Phan et al. (2004) summarize the formal-
ism starting with different implementation of the agents’ decision processes
whose aggregation is inspired from statistical mechanics to account for so-
cial influence in individual decisions. Lux (1995), Lux and Marchesi (1999),
Brock and Hommes (1999), Kaizoji (2000, 2010), and Kirman and Teyssiere
(2002) have developed related models in which agents’ successful forecasts
reinforce the forecasts. Such models have been found to generate swings in
opinions, regime changes and long memory. An essential feature of these
models is that agents are wrong for a fraction of the time but, whenever
they are in the majority, they are essentially right by a kind of self-fulfilling
prophecy. Thus, they are not systematically irrational (Kirman, 1997). Sor-
nette and Zhou (2006) showed how irrational Bayesian learning added to
the Ising model framework reproduces the stylized facts of financial markets.
Harras and Sornette (2011) showed how over-learning from lucky runs of ran-
dom news in the presence of social imitation may lead to endogenous bubbles
and crashes.
Here, we follow this modelling path and develop a model of the pricing
mechanism and resulting dynamics of two co-existing classes of assets, a risky
asset representing for instance the Internet sector during the dotcom bubble
and a risk-free asset, in the presence of two types of investors having different
opinions concerning the risky asset (Harrison and Kreps, 1978; Scheinkman
and Xiong, 2003). The first type of traders is a group of rational investors
who maximize their expected utility. The second type of traders is a group
of “noise traders” who trade only the risky asset by using heuristics such
as past momentum and social imitation. The noise traders do not consider
the fundamentals, while the rational investors allocate their wealth based on
their expectation of the future returns and risks of the risky asset.
Our framework combines elements from various groundbreaking works.
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The setup of noise traders follows closely Lux and Marchesi (1999), where an
opinion index determined by past momentum and social imitation describes
the prevailing investment behavior among this group. The description of
rational investors is related to Brock and Hommes (1999) and to Chiarella,
Dieci and He (2009). In particular, we employ a utility function with constant
relative risk aversion, as this is a realistic choice in a growing economy.
One important ingredient that we introduce here is that we do not allow
our agents to switch their investment behavior from rational to noise trading
or vice versa. This reflects the empirical fact that many large institutional
investors such as pension funds have to follow strict guidelines on how to
split their portfolio on assets of different risk classes. In previous models,
the occurrence of a bubble was related to a convergence of a large fraction of
traders on noise trading, see for example Lux and Marchesi (1999). Instead
of strategy switching, we account for the volatility of the imitation propen-
sity of noise traders by assuming that it fluctuates randomly around some
anchoring value as in (Stauffer and Sornette, 1999; Harras et al., 2012). By
keeping track of the agents’ wealth levels, we are able to explain bubbles
only with the transient increasing influence of noise traders on the market
price during an appreciation of the risky asset. While its price is rising, noise
traders believing in momentum tend to invest more in the risky asset and
thus become richer, thereby gaining more importance. The noise traders’
belief is further reinforced by social imitation, which becomes self-fulfilling.
This, in turn, has destabilizing effects leading to an increase in the volatil-
ity and usually finishes in a crash when the prevailing opinion switches to
pessimistic.
Our simple setup without strategy switching reproduces several stylized
facts of financial markets. The distribution of returns is fat-tailed with a re-
alistic power law exponent. Furthermore, signed returns are characterized by
a fast-decaying autocorrelation, while the autocorrelation function for abso-
lute returns has a long memory (volatility clustering). We show theoretically
and by simulations that bubbles start with a phase of transient faster-than-
exponential growth. Documented extensively for bubbles in real markets (see
for example Sornette et al. 2009, Jiang et al. 2010 and Yan et al. 2012) and
recently observed in lab experiments (Hu¨sler, Sornette and Hommes 2013),
so far this behavior has been rarely discussed in the context of agent-based
models. A first instantiation is found in (Corcos et al., 2002), in a much
simplified model of imitative and contrarian agents. The present model is
one of the first in which we can provide a transparent analytical explanation
for the existence of a transient faster-than-exponential growth. Moreover, we
observe approximate log-periodic behavior during the rise of a bubble, that
can result from the nature of the fluctuations of the opinion index. While
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many of the ingredients and conditions used in our agent-based model may
be found in various forms in some previous agent-based models, none have
documented explicitly the important transient super-exponential behavior
associated with bubbles, nor explained qualitatively or quantitatively the
underlying mechanisms and the coexisting salient stylized facts.
The paper is organized as follows: the basic model is presented in Section
2 and Section 3 and analyzed theoretically in Section 4. Numerical simu-
lations of the model are performed and the results are discussed in Section
5, together with a discussion and quantitative characterization of the price
dynamics, its returns and momentum strategies during the dotcom bubble
from 1998 to 2000. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Set-up of the model of an economy made
of rational and of noise investors
We consider fixed numbers Nrational of rational arbitrageurs and Nnoise of
noise investors who trade the same risky asset, represented here for simplic-
ity by a single representative risky asset fund. The arbitrageurs diversify
between the risky asset and a risk-free asset on the basis of the maximization
of their constant relative risk aversion expected utility, based on their expec-
tation of the returns and variance of the risky asset over the next period.
The noise traders use technical and social indicators, such as price momen-
tum and social imitation to allocate their wealth. A dynamically evolving
fraction of them buys the risky asset while others stay out of the risky asset
and have their wealth invested in the risk-free asset.
In the next subsection 2.1, we solve the standard allocation problem for
the rational investors that determines their demand for the risky asset. Then,
in subsection 2.2, the general ingredients controlling the dynamics of the
demand of noise traders are developed.
2.1 Allocation equation for the rational investors
The objective of the Nrational rational investors is assumed to be the max-
imization at each time t of the expected utility of their expected wealth Wt+1
at the next period, thus following Chiarella et al. (2009) and Hommes and
Wagener (2009). To perform this optimization, they select at each time t a
portfolio mix of the risky asset and of the risk-free asset that they hold over
the period from t to t+ 1. Such one-period ahead optimization strategy can
be reconciled with underlying expected utility maximizing stories as given for
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example in (Brock and Hommes 1997, 1998; Chiarella et al., 2009; Boswijk,
Hommes and Manzan 2007, Hommes and Wagener, 2009).
The rational investors are assumed to be identical, so that we can con-
sider the behavior of one representative rational investor hereafter. We shall
assume that rational investors are myopic mean-variance maximizers, which
means that only the expected portfolio value and its variance impact their
allocation. We denote Pt the price of the risky asset and Xt the number of
risky assets that the representative rational investor holds at instant t. We
also assume that the risky asset pays a dividend dt at each period t. Sim-
ilarly, Pft and Xft correspond to the price and number of a risk-free asset
held by the rational agent. The risk-free asset is in perfectly elastic supply
and pays a constant return Rf . Thus, at time t, the wealth of the rational
investor is given by
Wt = PtXt + PftXft . (1)
The wealth of the rational investor changes from time t to t+1 according
to
Wt+1 −Wt = (Pt+1 − Pt)Xt + (Pft+1 − Pft)Xft + dt+1Xt . (2)
This expression takes into account that the wealth at time t+1 is determined
by the allocation choice at time t and the new values of the risky and the
risk-free asset at time t + 1, which includes the payment of the dividend
(Wt+1 = Pt+1Xt + Pft+1Xft + dt+1Xt). Let us introduce the variables
xt :=
PtXt
Wt
, Rt+1 :=
Pt+1
Pt
− 1 , Rf := Pft+1
Pft
− 1 . (3)
They are respectively the fraction xt of the rational investor’s wealth invested
in the risky asset at time t, the discrete time return Rt+1 per stock of the
risky asset from time t to t + 1 and the risk-free rate of return Rf assumed
constant. This allows us to rewrite (2) as giving the total relative wealth
variation from t to t+ 1:
Wt+1 −Wt =Wt
[
Rf + xt
(
Rt+1 − Rf + dt+1
Pt
)]
≡Wt [Rf + xtRexcess,t+1] ,
(4)
where we define
Rexcess,t+1 = Rt+1 −Rf + dt+1/Pt (5)
as the excess return of capital and dividend gains over the risk-free rate.
The problem of the rational agent at time t is to maximize the expected
utility of his wealth for the next period by choosing the right proportion of
wealth xt to invest in the risky asset,
maxxt Et [U(Wt+1)] , (6)
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where Et[.] means the expectation of the variable in the bracket performed
at time t, i.e., under the knowledge of available information up to and in-
cluding time t. If we assume the rational agent to have constant relative risk
aversion, this proportion is constant in time and wealth. This can be shown
by employing the explicit utility function U(W ) exhibiting constant relative
risk aversion γ:
U(W ) =
{
log(W ), for γ = 1 ,
W 1−γ
1−γ
, for γ 6= 1 . (7)
Given this utility function and wealth evolution (4), it is easy to see that the
maximization condition (6) is independent of Wt.
We may obtain an approximate solution for xt in the special case where
the wealth does not change much, i.e. in the case of small returns, so that
the following expansion becomes approximately valid: Rf , Rexcess,t+1 ≪ 1.
Et[U(Wt+1)] = U(Wt) + U
′(Wt)Wt(Rf + xtEt[Rexcess,t+1])
+
1
2
U ′′(Wt)W
2
t x
2
tVart[Rexcess,t+1] +O(R3f , R3excess,t+1) .
(8)
Maximizing this expression with respect to xt gives
xt =
1
γ
Et[Rexcess,t+1]
Vart[Rexcess,t+1]
, (9)
where
γ ≡ −WtU
′′(Wt)
U ′(Wt)
. (10)
In expression (9), Et[Rexcess,t+1] ≡ Et[Rt+1]− Rf + Et[dt+1]/Pt represents
the total excess expected rate of return of the risky asset from time t to
t + 1 above the risk-free rate. In the following, we assume myopic rational
agents who do not learn but invest according to fundamental valuation. They
expect a steady relative growth rate embodied by a constant total excess rate
of return Rexcess, which is based on the behavior of stock markets in the long
run:
Rexcess := Et[Rt+1]− Rf + Et[dt+1]
Pt
= constant . (11)
We will assume that Rexcess > 0, so that the risky asset is desirable. The
variance Vart[Rexcess,t+1] will be denoted by σ˜
2 and is given by
σ˜2 := Vart[Rexcess,t+1] = σ
2 +
Var[dt+1]
P 2t
, σ2 := Var[Rt+1] . (12)
The expression for Vart[Rexcess,t+1] relies on the absence of correlation be-
tween Rt+1 and dt+1, because the dividend policy is assumed independent
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of the market price and vice-versa, as in the dividend irrelevancy theory of
Modigliani and Miller (1958; 1963). Rational investors take the quantities
Rt+1 and dt+1 as exogenous to the price dynamics developed below, because
they reflect the information coming from a fundamental analysis.
In the sequel, we assume that σ˜2 is constant, independent of the price
Pt. This corresponds to an expectation of the variance of dividends by the
rational investors that tracks the (square of the) price. Alternatively, if
Pt ≫
√
Var[dt+1]/σ2, σ˜
2 ≃ σ2 and σ˜2 is again approximately constant, as
long as the rational investors form a non-varying expectation of the volatility
of future prices of the risky asset. The assumption that σ˜2 is constant is also
made by Chiarella et al. (2009) and in the framework of Boswijk et al. (2007),
if investors are assumed to be myopic, i.e. only look at the next period.
Expression (9) then becomes
xt = x :=
Rexcess
γσ˜2
, (13)
which is a constant. Note that this is not an ad hoc assumption, but a
consequence of constant relative risk aversion and of the stationary nature
of the dividend process. In particular, because of the constant relative risk
aversion of the rational investor, as already mentioned, x is independent
of the current wealth Wt of the agent. This allows us to treat all rational
agents as one group with total wealth Wt irrespective of the distribution of
the agents’ individual wealth levels within the group. From here on, we will
call Wt the wealth of the rational investors.
The assumption, that the variance σ˜2 given by (12) is constant, im-
plies Var[dt] = (σ˜
2 − σ2)P 2t−1. Therefore, the flow of dividend dt follows the
stochastic process
dt = Pt−1 [r + σrut] , (14)
where r := Rexcess − Et−1[Rt] + Rf , σr =
√
σ˜2 − σ2 and ut forms a series of
standard i.i.d. random variables with distribution N(0, 1).
Thus, under the above assumptions, the rational investors rebalance their
portfolio so as to have a constant relative weight exposure to the risky asset.
This is equivalent to the traditional portfolio allocation benchmark of 70%
bonds and 30% stocks used by many mutual and pension funds. Rewriting
expression (2) with the condition of a fixed fraction x invested in the risky
asset, the wealth Wt at time t of the rational investors becomes at t + 1
Wt+1 = (Pt+1 + dt+1)x
Wt
Pt
+ (1− x)Wt(1 +Rf) . (15)
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The excess demand of the risky asset from t − 1 to t of the group of
rational investors is defined by
∆Drationalt := PtXt−PtXt−1 = PtXt−
Pt
Pt−1
Pt−1Xt−1 = xWt
(
1− Pt
Pt−1
Wt−1
Wt
)
.
(16)
Expression (2) with definitions (3) gives
Pt
Pt−1
Wt−1
Wt
=
Pt
(Pt + dt)x+ Pt−1(1− x)(1 +Rf ) . (17)
This allows us to rewrite the excess demand ∆Drationalt as
∆Drationalt = xWt−1
[
(1− x)Pt−1(1 +Rf )− Pt
Pt−1
+
xdt
Pt−1
]
, (18)
where x is given by expression (13). This last expression can be written,
using (14), as
∆Drationalt = xWt−1
[
(1− x)Pt−1(1 +Rf)− Pt
Pt−1
+ x(r + σrut)
]
. (19)
This corresponds to a kind of mean-reversing excess demand, where rational
investors tend to buy the risky asset when its price is low and vice-versa.
But this mean-reversing excess demand is adjusted by taking into account
two factors that quantify an abnormal price increase (resp. decrease), which
would justify unloading (resp. adding) the risky asset to the rational in-
vestors’ portfolio. First, a price change is compared with the change that
would occur if the corresponding wealth was instead invested in the risk-
free asset. Second, even if its price decreases, the risky asset may still be
attractive if it pays a sufficient dividend to compensate.
In absence of noise traders, the market clearing condition ∆Drationalt = 0
leads to
Pt = (1 +Rf )Pt−1 +
x
1− xdt . (20)
In the simplified case where the dividends dt are growing at a constant rate
g > 0 such that dt = d0(1 + g)
t, equation (20) solves into
Pt = (1 +Rf )
tP0 +
x
1− x(1 +Rf)
t d
Rf − g , (21)
for g < Rf , neglecting a term [(1 + g)/(1 +Rf )]
t compared to 1. One recog-
nizes the Gordon-Shapiro fundamental valuation, price = dividend/(Rf −g),
multiplied by a scaling factor taking into account the partitioning of the
wealth of the rational investors with the condition that a constant fraction
is invested in the risky asset.
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2.2 Excess demand of the noise traders
2.2.1 General framework
We assume that (a) the noise traders are characterized by polarized de-
cisions (in or out of the risky asset), (b) they tend to herd and (c) they
are trend-followers. A large body of literature indeed documents a lack-
of-diversification puzzle (Kelly, 1995; Baxter and Jermann, 1997; Statman,
2004) as well as over-reactions (Werner et al., 1987; 1990; Frank, 2004).
There is strong evidence for imitation and herding, even among sophisti-
cated mutual fund managers (Wermers, 1999), and technical analysis and
chart trading is ubiquitous.
We account for the observations of lack-of-diversification by assuming
that a noise trader is fully invested either in the risky asset or in the risk-free
asset. In contrast to the rational agents, our noise traders have different
opinions, which fluctuate stochastically according to laws given below. The
number of noise investors invested in the risky asset (respectively invested in
the risk-free asset) is N+t (respectively N
−
t ), and we have
N+t +N
−
t ≡ Nnoise . (22)
We do not aim at describing the heterogeneity between noise traders,
which has been shown to lead to fat-tailed distribution of their wealth as
a result of heterogenous investment decisions (Bouchaud and Mezard, 2000;
Klass et al., 2007; Harras and Sornette, 2011). This is not a restriction in so
far as we consider their aggregate impact.
Therefore, as for the rational investors, we treat the noise traders as one
group with total wealthW nt . The ratio of wealth of the group of noise traders
invested in the risky asset corresponds to the ratio of bullish investors among
the population of noise traders. Let us denote this quantity at time t by
xnt :=
N+t
Nnoise
. (23)
Then, the wealth W nt of noise traders at time t becomes at t+ 1
W nt+1 = (Pt+1 + dt+1)x
n
t
W nt
Pt
+ (1− xnt )W nt (1 +Rf) . (24)
The excess demand of the noise traders over the time interval (t − 1, t) is
equal to
∆Dnoiset = x
n
tW
n
t −
Pt
Pt−1
xnt−1W
n
t−1 = (25)
11
W nt−1
[
xnt (1− xnt−1)(1 +Rf )− xnt−1(1− xnt )
Pt
Pt−1
+ xnt x
n
t−1
dt
Pt−1
]
. (26)
Let us introduce the opinion index (Lux and Marchesi, 1999)
st :=
N+t −N−t
Nnoise
∈ [−1, 1] , (27)
which can be interpreted as the aggregate bullish (st > 0) versus bearish
(st < 0) stance of the noise traders with respect to the risky asset. With this
definition (27) and with (22), we have
N+t
Nnoise
=
1
2
(1 + st) = x
n
t ,
N−t
Nnoise
=
1
2
(1− st) = 1− xnt . (28)
Expression (26) with (28) yields
∆Dnoiset =
W nt−1
4Pt−1
[(1 + st)(1− st−1)(1 +Rf)Pt−1 − (1− st)(1 + st−1)Pt + (1 + st)(1 + st−1)dt] .
(29)
2.2.2 Master equation for the bullish/bearish noise trader unbal-
ance st
Let us now specify the dynamics of the opinion index st. We assume that,
at each time step, each noise trader may change her mind and either sell her
risky portfolio if she was previously invested or buy the risky portfolio if she
had only the risk-free asset. Again, we assume an all-or-nothing strategy
for each noise trader at each time step. Let p+t−1 be the probability that
any of the N+t−1 noise traders who is currently fully invested in the risky
portfolio decides to remove her exposure during the time interval (t − 1, t).
Analogously, let p−t−1 be the probability that any of the N
−
t−1 traders who are
currently (at time t − 1) out of the risky market decides to buy it. For a
noise trader k who owns the risky asset, her specific decision is represented
by the random variable ζk(p
+), which takes the value 1 (sell) with probability
p+ and the value 0 (keep the position) with probability 1 − p+. Similarly,
for a noise trader j who does not own the risky asset, her specific decision
is represented by the random variable ξj(p
−), which takes the value 1 (buy)
with probability p− and the value 0 (remain invested in the risk-free asset)
with probability 1 − p−. For given p+ and p−, the variables {ξj(p+)} and
{ζk(p−)} are i.i.d..
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Aggregating these decisions over all noise traders invested in the risky
asset at time t, we have
N+t =
N+
t−1∑
k=1
[1− ζk(p+t−1)] +
N−
t−1∑
j=1
ξj(p
−
t−1) . (30)
The first term in the r.h.s. of (30) corresponds to all the traders who held
the risky asset at t− 1 and continue to hold it at t. The second term in the
r.h.s. of (30) represents the noise traders who were holding the risk-free asset
at t− 1 and sold it to buy the risky asset at time t. Similarly,
N−t =
N+t−1∑
k=1
ζk(p
+
t−1) +
N−t−1∑
j=1
[1− ξj(p−t−1)] . (31)
The opinion index st (27) is thus given by
st =
1
Nnoise

N
+
t−1∑
k=1
[1− 2ζk(p+t−1)] +
N−t−1∑
j=1
[2ξj(p
−
t−1)− 1]

 . (32)
Using the i.i.d. property of the {ξj(p)} and {ζk(p)} variables allows us to
obtain the following exact expression for the mean of st:
E [st] = st−1 + p
−
t−1(1− st−1)− p+t−1(1 + st−1) . (33)
2.2.3 Influence of herding and momentum on the behavior of noise
traders
As can be seen from (29) together with (32), the probabilities p± embody
completely the behavior of the noise traders. We assume that p± at time
t− 1 are both a function of st−1 (social imitation effect) defined by (27) and
of a measure Ht of the price momentum given by
Ht = θHt−1 + (1− θ)
(
Pt
Pt−1
− 1
)
, (34)
which is nothing but the expression for an exponential moving average of the
history of past returns. The parameter 0 ≤ θ < 1 controls the length of the
memory that noise traders keep of past returns, the closer to 1, the longer
the memory ∼ 1/(1− θ).
Considering that the probabilities p± are functions of st−1 and Ht−1,
p±t−1 = p
±(st−1, Ht−1) , (35)
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means that the noise traders make their decisions to buy or sell the risky
Internet stock based on (i) the majority view held by their group and (ii)
the recent capital gains that the risky asset has provided over a time frame
∼ 1/(1 − θ). We assume the noise traders buy and sell symmetrically with
no bias: a strong herding in favor of the risky asset or a strong positive
momentum has the same relative effect on the drive to buy (or to sell) than
a strong negative sentiment or strong negative momentum on the push to
sell (or to buy). This is expressed by the following symmetry relation
p−(s,H) = p+(−s,−H) . (36)
The simplest functions satisfying (36) are the linear expressions1
p−(s,H) =
1
2
[p+ κ · (s+H)] , p+(s,H) = 1
2
[p− κ · (s+H)] . (37)
This defines two parameters p and κ, chosen sufficiently small such that
p−(s,H) and p+(s,H) remain between 0 and 1. The positive parameter p
controls the average holding time of the positions in the absence of any other
influence. In other words, a position will last typically ∼ 2/p time steps
in the absence of social imitation and momentum influence. The parameter
κ quantifies the strength of social interactions and of momentum trading.
Instead of κ, one could use two parameters for the opinion index and mo-
mentum, respectively. For the sake of parsimony we will only work with one
parameter treating s and H symmetrically. For instance, for κ > 0, if there
is already a majority of agents holding the risky asset and/or if its price
has been increasing recently, then the probability for noise traders holding
the risk-free asset to shift to the risky asset is increased and the probability
for the noise traders who are already invested to sell their risky asset is de-
creased. The reverse holds for κ < 0, which describes “contrarian” traders.
In the sequel, we will only consider the case κ > 0, which describes imitative
and trend-following agents. Generalizations to allow for additional heteroge-
neous beliefs, involving mixtures as well as adaptive imitative and contrarian
agents, is left for other communications. In this spirit, let us mention that
Corcos et al. (2002) have introduced a simple model of imitative agents who
turn contrarian when the proportion of herding agents is too large, which
generates chaotic price dynamics.
Putting expressions (37) in (33) yields
E [st] = (1 + κ− p)st−1 + κHt−1 . (38)
1Another possibility that is not further explored in this paper consists of employing the
hyperbolic tangent: p±(s,H) = 1
2
[1∓ κ/p tanh(s+H)]. These transition probabilities
correspond to the Glauber transition rates of an ensemble of spins on a fully connected
graph with equal interaction strengths, see for example Harras et al. (2012).
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3 Dynamical market equations
3.1 Market clearing condition and price dynamics
The equation for the risky asset price dynamics is obtained from the
condition that, in the absence of external supply, the total excess demand
summed over the rational and the noise traders vanishes:
∆Drationalt +∆D
noise
t = 0 . (39)
In other words, the net buy orders of noise traders are satisfied by the net sell
orders of the rational traders, and vice-versa. Substituting in (39) expression
(19) for the excess demands ∆Drationalt of the rational investors and equation
(29) for the excess demand ∆Dnoiset of the noise traders, we obtain the price
equation
Pt
Pt−1
=
[
(1 + st) ((1 +Rf)(1− st−1) + (r + σrut)(1 + st−1))W nt−1
+4x ((1 +Rf)(1− x) + (r + σrut)x)Wt−1] / (40)[
(1 + st−1)(1− st)W nt−1 + 4Wt−1x(1 − x)
]
.
Expression (40) shows that the price of the risk asset changes as a result of
two stochastic driving forces: (i) the dividend-price ratio (r + σrut) and (ii)
the time increments of the bullish/bearish noise trader unbalance {st}. The
impact of {st} is controlled by the wealth of the group of noise traders W nt−1.
As we shall demonstrate below, this becomes particularly important during
a bubble where trend-following noise traders tend to gain much more than
rational investors. With the increasing influence of noise traders, the market
becomes much more prone to self-fulfilling prophecies. Rational traders are
less able to attenuate the irrational exuberance – they simply do not have
enough wealth invested in the game.
3.2 Complete set of dynamical equations
Let us put all ingredients of our model together to state concisely all the
equations controlling the price dynamics coupled with the opinion forming
process of the noise traders. As discussed above, the wealth levels of the
rational and noise traders are also time-dependent and influence the market
dynamics. We thus arrive at the following equations.
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Dynamics of the noise traders opinion index:
st =
1
Nnoise

Nnoise(1+st−1)/2∑
k=1
[
1− 2ζk(p+t−1)
]
+
Nnoise(1−st−1)/2∑
j=1
[
2ξj(p
−
t−1)− 1
] ,
(41)
where ζk(p
+
t−1) takes the value 1 with probability p
+
t−1 and the value 0 with
probability 1− p+t−1, ξj(p−t−1) takes the value 1 with probability p−t−1 and the
value 0 with probability 1− p−t−1, and p+t−1 and p−t−1 are given by expressions
(37):
p−t−1(st−1, Ht−1) =
1
2
[p+ κ · (st−1 +Ht−1)] ,
p+t−1(st−1, Ht−1) =
1
2
[p− κ · (st−1 +Ht−1)] .
(42)
Thus, E [st] given by expression (38).
Dynamics of the risky asset price:
Pt/Pt−1 =
[
(1 + st) ((1 +Rf)(1− st−1) + (r + σrut)(1 + st−1))W nt−1+
+4x ((1 +Rf )(1− x) + (r + σrut)x)Wt−1] / (43)[
(1 + st−1)(1− st)W nt−1 + 4x(1− x)Wt−1
]
.
Weath dynamics of rational investors:
Wt/Wt−1 = x
(
Pt
Pt−1
+ (r + σrut)
)
+ (1− x)(1 +Rf ) . (44)
Weath dynamics of noise traders:
W nt /W
n
t−1 =
1 + st−1
2
(
Pt
Pt−1
+ (r + σrut)
)
+
1− st−1
2
(1 +Rf) . (45)
Momentum of the risky asset price:
Ht = θHt−1 + (1− θ)
(
Pt
Pt−1
− 1
)
. (46)
And ut forms a series of standard i.i.d. random variables with distribution
N(0, 1).
The set of equations (41) to (46) together with the realization of the
stochastic dividend process ut completely specify the model and its dynam-
ics. Equation (41) describes how noise traders form their opinion st based
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on the previous prevalent opinion st−1 and the recent price trend Ht. Ratio-
nal traders stick to their choice of investing x in the risky asset. Equation
(43) gives the new market price Pt when excess demands of both groups are
matched. Equations (44) and (45) describe the evolution of the wealth levels
Wt and W
n
t for rational and noise traders, respectively. There are capital
gains and dividend gains from the risky asset, and interest payments by the
risk-free asset. The new market price also feeds into the momentum of the
risky asset described by equation (46).
We have the following flow of causal influences:
1. The recent price trendHt−1 and the prevailing opinion st−1 among noise
traders determine the investment decision of noise traders governed by
st, while rational traders invest a constant fraction x of their wealth.
2. Market clearing determines the price Pt based on investment decisions
x and st, and previous wealth levels Wt−1 and W
n
t−1 for rational and
noise traders, respectively.
3. The new wealth levels Wt and W
n
t are based on the market price Pt
and investment decisions x and st.
3.3 Control parameters and their time-scale depen-
dence
The set of equations (41) to (46) depends on the following parameters:
1. x quantifies the constant fraction of wealth that rational traders invest
in the risky asset.
2. θ fixes the time scale over which noise traders estimate price momen-
tum. By construction, 0 ≤ θ < 1.
3. NNoise is the number of noise traders that controls the fluctuations of
the majority opinion of noise traders.
4. p controls the average holding time of the positions of noise traders in
the absence of any other influence.
5. κ quantifies the strength of social interactions and of momentum trad-
ing by noise traders.
6. Rf is the rate of return of the risk-free asset.
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7. r and σr are the mean and standard deviation of the dividend-price
ratio.
In order to have an intuitive understanding of the role and size of these
parameters, it is useful to discuss how they depend on the time scale over
which traders reassess their positions. Until now, we have expressed the time
t in units of a unit step 1, which could be taken for instance to be associated
with the circadian rhythm, i.e., one day. But there is no fundamental reason
for this choice and our theory has the same formulation under a change of the
time step. Let us call τ the time interval between successive reassessments
of the rational investors, with τ being measured in a calendar time scale, for
instance, in seconds, hours or days.
First, the parameters Nnoise and Nrational are a priori independent of τ ,
while they may be a function of time t. We neglect this dependence as
we are interested in the dynamics over time scales of a few years that are
characteristic of bubble regimes. The parameter γ is also independent of τ .
In contrast, the parameters Rf , r and σ
2
r are functions of τ , as the return
of the risk-free asset, the average expected dividend return and its variance
depend on the time scale. The simplest and standard dependence of Wiener
processes or discrete random walks is Rf ∼ r ∼ σ2r ∼ τ . Because of its
definition, x = Rexcess/γσ˜
2, the fraction of wealth x rational investors hold is
independent of time.
By construction, the parameter θ characterizing the memory of the price
momentum influencing the decisions of noise traders depends on τ . This can
be seen by replacing t − 1 by t − τ to make explicit the unit time scale in
expression (34), giving
Ht −Ht−τ
τ
=
1− θ
τ
(
Pt
Pt−τ
− 1−Ht−τ
)
. (47)
Requesting a bona-fide limit for small τ ’s leads to
1− θ
τ
= ̺ = const , (48)
where the time scale TH := 1/̺ is the true momentum memory. Thus, we
have
1− θ = ̺ · τ, TH := 1
̺
=
τ
1− θ . (49)
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4 Theoretical analysis and super-exponential
bubbles
4.1 Reduction to deterministic equations
It is possible to get an analytical understanding of the solutions of the
set of equations (41) to (46) if we reduce them into their deterministic com-
ponents. The full set including their stochastic contributions will be studied
with the help of numerical simulations in the next section.
Taking ut ≡ 0 and replacing st by its expectation E[st] given by (38), we
obtain the following deterministic equations
Dynamics of the noise traders opinion index:
st = (1 + κ− p)st−1 + κHt−1 , (50)
Dynamics of the risky asset price:
Pt/Pt−1 =
[
(1 + st) ((1 +Rf )(1− st−1) + r(1 + st−1))W nt−1+
+4x ((1 +Rf)(1− x) + rx)Wt−1] / (51)[
(1 + st−1)(1− st)W nt−1 + 4x(1− x)Wt−1
]
.
Weath dynamics of rational investors:
Wt/Wt−1 = x
(
Pt
Pt−1
+ r
)
+ (1− x)(1 +Rf ) , (52)
Weath dynamics of noise traders:
W nt /W
n
t−1 =
1 + st−1
2
(
Pt
Pt−1
+ r
)
+
1− st−1
2
(1 +Rf ) , (53)
Momentum of the risky asset price:
Ht = θHt−1 + (1− θ)
(
Pt
Pt−1
− 1
)
. (54)
This system of five coupled deterministic equations is non-linear and com-
pletely coupled, there is no autonomous subsystem. In particular, the multi-
plicative price equation is highly non-linear. The wealth equations describe
the multiplicative process of capital accumulation depending on the choice
of how to split the portfolio on the risky and risk-free asset yielding capital
gains, given the dividend gains and the risk-free rate.
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4.2 Fixed points and stability analysis
To gain insights into the system of coupled equations, we will consider
the scenarios in which the wealth levels of rational and noise traders grow at
the same steady rate ρ,
Wt =W0ρ
t , W nt =W
n
0 ρ
t . (55)
These scenarios are those for which the two populations of rational and noise
traders remain relevant in the economy. In other cases in which one of the
two populations sees his wealth growing faster than the other one, at long
times, it will completely dominate the economy, leading to unrealistic and
trivial dynamics.
This allows us to decouple the equations for Ht, st and Pt from the wealth
equations. Assuming equal initial wealth levels W n0 = W0, the fixed points
{(H∗, s∗)} are determined by the system:
H∗ = Rf + r
(1 + s∗)2 + 4x2
(1 + s∗)(1− s∗) + 4x(1− x) , (56)
s∗ =
κ
p− κH
∗ . (57)
Since this system is essentially one third-order equation, it can be solved
analytically yielding three fixed points. As we will see later, for typical
parameter values, there is one solution s∗, H∗ ≪ 1, while the other two lie
outside the restricted domain of [−1, 1] for s. It can be estimated as
H∗ = Rf +
1 + 4x
1 + 4x− 4x2 r +O(r
2, R2f) , (58)
s∗ =
κ
p− κ
[
Rf +
1 + 4x
1 + 4x− 4x2 r +O(r
2, R2f)
]
. (59)
This fixed point is stable for κ < p over a range of the other parameter
values and is unstable for κ > p. A deviation from the fixed point due to
stochastic fluctuations in the opinion index leads to a price change in the same
direction. According to (50), for κ > p, the opinion index grows transiently
exponentially (until its saturation). Since the stability is mainly governed by
the relative value of the two parameters κ and p characterizing noise trader
behavior, we conclude that there is an inherent instability caused by herding
and trend following, which is independent of the stochastic dividend process.
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4.3 Super-exponential bubbles
It is well-known that many bubbles in financial markets start with a
phase of super-exponential growth, see for example Sornette et al. (2009) for
oil prices, Jiang et al. (2010) for the Chinese stock market and Yan et al.
(2012) for major equity markets. Furthermore, Sornette et al. (2013) discuss
various theoretical and empirical questions related to faster-than-exponential
growth of asset prices, while Hu¨sler et al. (2013) document super-exponential
bubbles in a controlled experiment in the laboratory.
Phases with faster-than-exponential growth of the price are inherent also
in the present model. If a bubble is essentially driven by herding and trend
following, we may neglect the dividend process and expand the pricing for-
mula (51) in terms of r and Rf :
Pt
Pt−1
=
(1 + st)(1− st−1) + 4x(1− x)Wt−1/W nt−1
(1− st)(1 + st−1) + 4x(1− x)Wt−1/W nt−1
+O(r, Rf ) . (60)
Again, we use focus on the scenario that the ratio of the wealth levels Wt−1
and W nt−1 of the rational and noise traders remains approximately constant,
Wt−1/W
n
t−1 = Wt0/W
n
t0
= const . (61)
This is the case if both wealths grow at the same constant exponential growth
rate or, more accurate here, if they both grow super-exponentially in the same
way. Starting with an opinion index s0 at time t = t0, we can further simplify
the price equation to:
Pt
Pt−1
= 1 + b(st − st−1) +O(r, Rf , (s− s0)2) , (62)
where the constant quantity b is of order 1 provided the initial levels of wealth
are of the same order of magnitude:
b =
2
1 + 4x(1− x)Wt0/W nt0 − s20
∼ O(1) . (63)
Therefore, up to terms of order O(r, Rf , (s− s0)2), the price evolves as
Pt
P0
=
t∏
j=1
[1 + b(sj − sj−1)] ≃
t∏
j=1
eb(sj−sj−1) = eb(st−s0) . (64)
Since st grows exponentially with time according to expression (50) for κ > p,
the price Pt grows as an exponential of an exponential of time. In other
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words, for the regimes when the opinion index grows exponentially (κ > p),
we expect super-exponential bubbles in the price time series. Since our equa-
tions are symmetric in the sign of the opinion index st, the same mechanism
leads also to “negative bubbles” for a negative herding associated with a
transition from bullish to bearish behavior for which the price drops also
super-exponentially in some cases.
4.4 Time-dependent social impact and bubble dynam-
ics
The strength of herding is arguably regime dependent. In some phases,
noise traders are prone to herding, while at other times, they are more in-
coherently disorganized “noise” traders. This captures in our dynamical
framework the phenomenon of regime switching (Hamilton, 1989; Lux, 1995;
Hamilton and Raj, 2002; Yukalov et al., 2009; Binder and Gross, 2013; Fisher
and Seidl, 2013; Kadilli, 2013), where successive phases are characterized by
changing values of the herding propensity. In this respect, we follow the
model approach of Harras et al. (2012) developed in a similar context and
assume that the strength κ of social interactions and momentum influence
slowly varies in time. In this way, we incorporate the effects of a chang-
ing world on financial markets such as a varying economic and geopolitical
climate into the model. More generally, we allow for varying uncertainties
influencing the behavior of noise traders. As we shall show, this roots the
existence of the bubbles documented below in the mechanism of “sweeping
of an instability” (Sornette, 1994; Stauffer and Sornette, 1999).
More specifically, we propose that κ undergoes a discretized Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process:2
κt − κt−1 = η(µκ − κt−1) + σκvt . (65)
Here η > 0 is the mean reversion rate, µκ is the mean reversion level and
σκ > 0 is the step size of the Wiener process realized by the series vt of
standard i.i.d. random variables with distribution N(0, 1).
Our approach is related to how Lux (1995) describes switching between
bear and bull markets. While we propose a stochastic process for the strength
of social interactions κ, Lux adds a new deterministic term proportional
to d logPt/dt to the transition probabilities, which corresponds to a direct
positive feedback.
2Choosing a confined random walk yields similar results, but the mean reversion is then
effectively nonlinear (or threshold based), which is less standard.
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The interesting case is µκ . p, where κ is on average below the criti-
cal value p but, due to stochastic fluctuations, may occasionally enter the
regime with faster-than-exponential growth κ > p described in the previous
subsection. Since an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with deterministic initial
value is a Gaussian process, its distribution is fully determined by the first
and second moments. Starting from an initial value κ0, the non-stationary
mean and covariance are given by:
E[κt] = κ0e
−ηt + µκ
(
1− e−ηt) , (66)
Cov[κs, κt] =
σ2κ
2η
(
e−η(t−s) + e−η(t+s)
)
, s < t . (67)
Both moments converge such that in the long run κt admits the following
stationary distribution:
κt ∼ N
(
µ,
σκ√
2η
)
. (68)
If, at some time t, the social interaction strength is above the critical value
κt ≡ κ0 > p, the time ∆T needed for κt to revert to the subcritical regime
κt < p can be estimated from equation (66):
∆T =
1
η
log
(
κ0 − µκ
p− µκ
)
. (69)
Expressions (68) and (69) will allow us to estimate how often the group
of noise traders will interact in the supercritical regime of the opinion index
related to transient faster-than-exponential growth in the price and how long
a typical bubble will last.
5 Numerical simulations and comparison with
the dotcom bubble
5.1 Estimation of parameter values
Let us take τ = 1 day and assume a typical memory used by noise
traders for the estimation of price momentum equal to about one month.
This amounts approximately to 20 trading days, hence TH ≃ τ1−θ = 20,
leading to θ = 0.95.
We calibrate the average dividend-price ratio r and its standard deviation
σr to the values given by Engsted and Pedersen (2010), which are quite
similar for various countries. We set the mean daily dividend-price ratio to
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r = 1.6·10−4 and the daily standard deviation to σr = 9.5·10−4. Furthermore,
we assume a constant return of the risk-free asset of annualized 2%, i.e. a
daily value of Rf = 8 · 10−5.
Rational investors keep 30% of their wealth in the risky asset, that is,
x = 0.3. The wealth levels Wt and W
n
t of rational and noise traders evolve
dynamically and determine the relative influence of the two groups. We
analyze the importance of the initial endowmentsW0 andW
n
0 on the stability
of the market. We capture this by the parameter ν = W n0 /W0 and set ν to
1, 1/2 or 2 in three different sets of simulations.3
For the parameter p entering in expressions (37), recall that it is equal
to twice the probability that during a given day some noise trader will buy
(or sell) the risky asset. We posit p = 0.2, which means that the natural
trading frequency of traders in absence of social influence is about two weeks.
For the parameter κ in (37) describing the strength of social interactions
and of momentum trading, we assume that it is close to the parameter p.
Specifically, for the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process given in expression (65), we
choose µκ = 0.98p = 0.196. We set the mean reversion speed η and the
step size σκ such that (i) the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process has a standard
deviation of 0.1p and (ii) a deviation of κt two standard deviations above µκ
in the supercritical regime will revert within ∆T = TH = 20:
η =
1
∆T
log
(
µκ + 2 · 0.1p− µκ
p− µκ
)
= log(10)/20 ≃ 0.11 , (70)
σκ = 0.1p
√
2η ≃ 0.001 . (71)
Summarizing, the numerical simulations presented in the figures correspond
to
θ = 0.95, r = 1.6 ·10−4, σr = 9.5 ·10−4, Rf = 8 ·10−5, x = 0.3 , (72)
p = 0.2, µκ = 0.196, σκ = 0.001, η = 0.11 , (73)
and ν will be varied as ν = 0.5, 1, 2. Furthermore, we run the simulations
over 20 trading years, i.e. T = 5000.
We can now test our claims from the fixed points analysis in section 4.2
numerically. Assuming that κt will not deviate further than five standard
deviations from its mean µκ, we find that one fixed point for the opinion
index is indeed close to zero, s∗ ∼ O(10−3), while the other two lie well
outside of the domain of definition [−1, 1].
3Note that this is equivalent to setting the ratio of group sizes ν = Nrational/Nnoise with
the assumption that both groups consist of representative agents with equal initial wealth.
In our formulation, Nnoise has no further importance than controlling the randomness of
the opinion index. Thus it disappears from the deterministic equations (50) to (54).
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5.2 Results and interpretation
Figs. 1, 4 and 5 show the time dependence of the variables Pt, st, κt,
Ht, Wt, W
n
t and the time series of returns that are generated by numerical
solutions of the set (41) to (46) for three different parameter values for ν =
1, 2 and 0.5 respectively, of the relative important of noise traders compared
with rational investors in their price impact.
Fig. 1 corresponds to the situation where both groups have equal initial
endowments (ν = 1). One can observe a general positive log-price trend
biasing upward a fluctuating random walk-like trajectory. The upward drift
reflects a combination of the dividend gains, of the rate of return paid by the
risk-free asset as well as a component resulting from the herding behavior of
noise traders who tend intermittently to push prices in a kind of self-fulfilling
prophecy or convention a` la Orle´an (Boyer and Orle´an 1992; Orle´an, 1994;
Eymard-Duvernay et al. 2005).
But the most striking aspect of the price dynamics is the occurrence of
four clearly identifiable bubbles occurring within the chosen time interval,
defined by the transient explosive growth of the price Pt followed by sharp
crashes bringing the prices back approximately to pre-bubble levels. As seen
from the second panel of Fig. 1 showing the opinion index dynamics of the
noise traders, the bubbles are essentially driven by the noise traders. As de-
scribed in section 4.3, the start of the growth of herding among noise traders
feeds the price dynamics, resulting in a larger price momentum (fourth
panel), which amplifies herding, enhancing further the bubble growth and
so on. One can observe in each bubble that the growth of the opinion index
(or equivalently the fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset) precedes
and then accompanies the explosive price growth, as predicted by expression
(64). The transient bubbles and their subsequent crashes are associated with
clustered volatility and the existence of outliers in the price momentum. Dur-
ing the bubbles, the wealth levels of noise traders and of rational investors
diverge. In the long run, noise traders outperform rational investors because
they tend to invest more in the risky asset, which exhibits higher average
returns.
Fig. 2 presents a more detailed analysis of a typical bubble from the
time series shown in Fig. 1, demonstrating the characteristic transient faster-
than-exponential growth behavior predicted theoretically in section 4.3. For
periods when κt > p, we may approximate the opinion index as exponentially
growing:
st = s1(α
t
1 − 1) , (74)
where t runs over the growth period [t1, t1 + ∆T ], with initial value s1 ≡
st1 and where α1 > 1 is an empirical effective multiplicative factor, logα1
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being the effective growth rate of st. One can verify that the length ∆T of
such a period is compatible with our theoretical prediction (69), which for
our chosen parameters gives ∆T = 20. Bubbles with longer lifetimes are
easily engineered in our framework by allowing κ to remain close and higher
than p for longer times. Our model supports therefore the view that long-
lived bubbles may be associated with excess positive sentiments catalyzing a
herding propensity that is sustained and self-reinforcing (via the momentum
mechanism) over long periods.
Furthermore, the exponential growth in the opinion index results in a
faster-than-exponential growth of the price, as can be seen in the log-linear
plot of Pt. From expression (64), we deduce
log(Pt) = b1s1(α
t
1 − 1) + log(P0) , (75)
where b1 = bt1 , which fits well the transient super-exponential price dynamics.
These observations presented in Fig. 2 are in agreement with the theoretical
derivation of section 4.3. It is interesting to note also that the dynamics
of κt, with its tendency to present a transient oscillatory behavior due to
the interplay between rare large excursions with the mean reversal of the
constrained random walk associated with the discrete Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process, leads to an approximate log-periodic behavior4 of the price during
its ascendency, which is similar to many observations reported empirically
(Sornette, 2003; Johansen and Sornette, 2010; Jiang et al., 2010; Yan et al.,
2012; Sornette et al., 2013).
Fig. 3 presents three statistical properties of our generated price time
series. Various well-known stylized facts are matched by our model. First,
we show the distribution of absolute values of the returns, which has a fat-
tail p(x) ∼ x−1−α with exponent α = 3.0, which is in the range of accepted
values in the empirical literature (de Vries, 1994; Pagan, 1996; Guillaume et
al., 1997; Gopikrishnan et al., 1998; Jondeau and Rockinger, 1999). Further-
more, signed returns Rt are characterized by a fast-decaying autocorrelation
function, which is consistent with an almost absence of arbitrage opportuni-
ties in the presence of transaction costs. In contrast, the absolute values |Rt|
of returns have an autocorrelation function with longer memory (Ding et al.,
1993; Cont, 2007).
Figs. 4 and 5 present the same panels as in Fig. 1 but with ν = 2 and
ν = 1/2, respectively. Due to their larger relative weight compared to the case
shown in Fig. 1, one can observe in Figs. 4 bubbles with stronger “explosive”
trajectories. The wealth of noise traders fluctuates widely, but amplifies to
4Log-periodicity here refers to transient oscillations with increasing local frequency.
Formal mathematical definitions and illustrations can be found in (Sornette, 1998).
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values that are many times larger than that of rational investors. This is
due to the self-fulfilling nature of the noise trader strategies that impact the
price dynamics. In contrast, Fig. 5 with ν = 1/2 shows that the wealth of the
rational investors remains high for a long transient, even if in the long term
the noise traders end up dominating the price dynamics. The noise traders
also transiently over-perform dramatically the rational investors during the
bubbles. It is informative to observe that, even when they are a minority
(ν = 1/2 shown in Fig. 5), the noise traders end up creating bubbles and
crashes. Their influence progressively increases and their transient herding
behavior becomes intermittently destabilizing.
5.3 Comparison with the dotcom bubble
This section compares the insights obtained from the above theoretical
and numerical analyses to empirical evidence on momenta and reversals in
the period when the dotcom bubble developed.5 We study the characteristics
of the share prices of Internet-related companies over the period from January
1, 1998 to December 31, 2002, which covers the period of the development
of the dotcom bubble and its collapse. We use the list of 400 companies
belonging to the Internet-related sector that has been published by Morgan
Stanley and has already been investigated by Ofek and Richardson (2003).
The criteria for a company to be included in that list is that it must be
considered a “pure” internet company, i.e., whose commercial goals are as-
sociated exclusively to the Internet. This implies that technology companies
such as Cisco, Microsoft, and telecommunication firms, notwithstanding their
extensive Internet-related businesses, are excluded.
Fig. 6 graphs the index of an equally weighted portfolio of the Internet
stocks over the sample period of January 1998 to December 2002. The time
evolution of the equally weighted portfolio of the Internet stocks is strikingly
different from that shown in figure 7 for the index of an equally weighted
portfolio of non-Internet stocks over this same period. The two indexes are
scaled to be 100 on January 2, 1998. The two figures illustrate clearly the
widely held view that a divergence developed over this period between the
relative pricing of Internet stocks and the broad market as a whole. In the
two year period from early 1998 through February 2000, the internet related
sector earned over 1300 percent returns on its public equity while the price
index of the non-internet sectors rose by only 40 percent. However, these
astronomical returns of the Internet stocks had completely evaporated by
5The dotcom bubble (followed by its subsequent crash) is widely believed to be a
speculative bubble, as documented by Ofek and Richardson (2003), Brunnermeier and
Nagel (2004), and Battalio and Schultz (2006).
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March 2001. Note how Fig. 6 is strikingly similar to the dynamics generated
by the theoretical model in the bubble regime shown at the end of the top
panel of Fig. 5 (ν = 0.5).
Table 1: Annual Returns for Internet and non-Internet stock
indices
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Internet stock index 116.8% 815.6% −875.9% −62% −48.8%
(per month) (9.7%) (68%) (−73%) (−5.2%) (−4.1%)
Non-internet stock index 6.5% 17% −9% 3.6% −9%
(per month) (0.5%) (1.4%) (−0.8%) (0.3%) (−0.7%)
We now focus our attention on the profitability of the momentum strate-
gies studied by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) and others. Table 1 pro-
vides some descriptive statistics about annual returns of the Internet-stock
index versus of the non-Internet stock index from the beginning of 1998 to
the end of 2002. In the 12 months of 1998, the annual cumulative return
of the Internet stock index was 117 percent, while that of the non-Internet
stock index was 6.5 percent. In the 12 months of 1999, the annual cumu-
lative return of the Internet stock index surged to 816 percent, and that of
the non-Internet stock index increased to 16.6 percent. The Internet stock
index clearly outperformed the non-Internet stock index by 800 percent in
1999. This implies a strong profitability of momentum strategies applied to
the Internet stocks over the period of the dotcom bubble. However, after its
burst in March 2000, the return of the Internet stocks sharply declined, from
2000 to 2002. In the 12 months of 2000, the annual return of the internet-
stock index fell to - 876 percent, followed by - 62 percent and - 49 percent in
2001 and in 2002, respectively. On the other hand, the annual returns of the
non-Internet stock index in the period from 2000 to 2002 remain modest in
amplitude at - 9 percent, 3.6 percent and - 9 percent, respectively. After the
bust of the dotcom bubble, the Internet stocks continued to underperform
the non-Internet stocks.
Table 2 shows the cumulative returns for the Internet stock index and for
the non-Internet stock index in the five years from the beginning of 1998 to
the end of 2002. The cumulative return of the Internet stock index in the
first 24 months of the holding period is 932.5 percent, but the cumulative
returns ends at the net loss of - 54.2 percent over the five year holding period.
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In contrast, the cumulative returns of the non-Internet stock index over the
same five year holding period is 8.6 percent.
These figures can be reproduced by our simulations, and are visualized
by the extremely good performance of our noise traders during the bubble
phases, as shown in the fifth panels (from the top) of Figs. 1, 4 and 5.
Table 2: Cumulative Returns for Internet and non-Internet
stock indices
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Internet stock index 116.8% 932.5% 56.6% −5.4% −54.2%
(per month) (9.7%) (38.9%) (1.6%) (−0.1%) (−0.9%)
Non-internet stock index 6.5% 23.1% −14% 17.6% 8.6%
(per month) (0.5%) (1.0%) (0.4%) (0.4%) (0.1%)
In summary, these empirical facts constitute strong evidence for the In-
ternet stock for momentum profit at intermediate time scales of about two
years and reversals at longer time scales of about 5 years. These empirical
facts confirm for this specific bubble and crash period the general evidence
documented by many researchers (e.g. Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993, 2001).
They are consistent with the stylized facts described by the model that pre-
dict that the momentum profits will eventually reverse in cycle bubbles and
crashes as illustrated above. The quantitative comparison between the em-
pirical data and our simulations suggest that noise traders do not need to
be a majority, as their superior performance during the bubble make them
dominate eventually utterly the investment ecology.
6 Conclusions
We have introduced a model of financial bubbles with two assets (risky
and risk-free), in which rational investors and noise traders co-exist. Ratio-
nal investors form expectations on the return and risk of a risky asset and
maximize their constant relative risk aversion expected utility with respect
to their portfolio allocation. Noise traders are subjected to social imitation
and follow momentum trading.
In contrast to various previous models, agents do not switch between
investment strategies. By keeping track of their wealth levels, we still ob-
serve the formation of endogenous bubbles and match several stylized facts
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of financial markets such as a fat-tail distribution of returns and volatility
clustering. In particular, we observe transient faster-than-exponential bub-
ble growth with approximate log-periodic behavior. Although faster-than-
exponential growth at the beginning of a bubble has been found for many
bubbles in real markets and recent lab experiments, it has been hardly dis-
cussed in the literature. Our model is one of the first offering a transparent
analytical explanation for this stylized fact.
To the important question of whether and when rational investors are
able to stabilize financial markets by arbitraging noise traders, our analysis
suggests that noise traders may eventually always lead to the creation of bub-
bles, given sufficient time, if a mechanism exists or some sentiment develops
that increase their propensity for herding.
The model has been found to account well for the behavior of traders and
for the price dynamics that developed during the dotcom bubble in 1995-
2000. Momentum strategies have been shown to be transiently profitable,
supporting the hypothesis that these strategies enhance herding behavior.
Acknowledgements: We are grateful to Yannick Malevergne for stim-
ulating remarks on an earlier version of the manuscript.
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Fig. 1: Time dependence of the variables Pt (log-scale), st, κt, Ht,
Wt, W
n
t (both in log-scale) and the time series of returns that are
generated by numerical solutions of the set (41) to (46) for the value
ν = 1 of the relative important of noise traders compared with rational
investors in their price impact at the origin of time.
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Fig. 6: The equally weighted Internet stock index for the period
1/2/1998-12/31/2002. The index is scaled to be 100 on 1/2/1998.
Fig. 7: The equally weighted non-Internet stock index for the period
1/2/1998-12/31/2002. The index is scaled to be 100 on 1/2/1998.
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